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The Practice of Principle: 
In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 
Jules L. Coleman 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 (226 pp) 
Reviewed by Robbie Mosert 
In this densely-packed book1 purporting to cover all significant areas of 
contemporary jurisprudence, the author's goal seems to be twofold: 
First, he seeks to cast doubt on the popular Dworkinian wisdom that the 
project of explaining the law is conceptually tied up with the project of 
justifying it. Second, by employing a novel version of conceptual 
analysis, he aims to advance a "pragmatic" account of the central 
concepts in jurisprudence. 
The book is comprised of twelve chapters, or 'Lectures', each of 
which was presented in lesser or different form at Oxford University in 
1998 as part of the Clarendon Lectures in Law series at which the author 
defended his version of inclusive legal positivism. The first move in the 
book is an application of the pragmatic method to tort law, and 
Coleman's target is any purported 'economic analysis' of law. The 
author's claim is that economic analyses misconstrue important parts of 
legal practice by treating law as a matter of efficiency. Indeed, a prag-
matic conceptual analysis of to1i law reveals, on the contrary, that torts 
are best understood as embodying a principle of corrective justice, 
whose moral ideal is independent of its role in explaining tort law. Next, 
the author goes on to argue that the law's nonnativity (its claim to 
authority) can be explained in terms of its giving us reasons for action 
that can be fmther specified by the notion of 'shared cooperative ac-
tions'. Last, Coleman defends his theory against several alternative 
accounts of the goals of jurisprudence. As he sees it, the overall project 
t Robbie Moser (M.A., Dalhousie, 2002) is pursuing a career in philosophy and furthering his 
studies in Halifax, NS. His interests are in legal and moral philosophy, and the philosophy of 
St Thomas Aquinas. 
1 Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal 
The01y (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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of jurisprudence is to identify "normatively significant" components of 
legal practice by explaining them as the embodiment of principle. 
Coleman puts his pragmatic conceptual analysis to work on tort law. 
On his analysis, tort law embodies or makes explicit the principle of 
corrective justice inasmuch as the principle identifies specific pieces of 
the practice as "normatively significant". The central concepts of tort 
law - harm, cause, repair, fault, etc. - construct a web of inferential 
relations that articulate corrective justice and define its requirements. As 
Coleman sees it, economic analysis gives rise to various "function-
based" economic explanations of tort law, all of which fail to adequately 
or consistently describe a working jurisprudence. According to eco-
nomic analysis, the function of law is to optimally reduce accident costs. 
How well the law does this depends on a) the degree to which it reduces 
the cost of accidents, and b) the cost of its doing so. Coleman's com-
plaint is that concepts like negligence that conceptually accompany tort 
law have been reduced to the economic terms of cost and risk. It follows, 
then, that if tort law were practiced the way the economist describes it, 
plaintiffs would gather evidence not to the effect that there is a failure to 
comply with a duty, but rather to the effect that the defendant will absorb 
the least costs. But our actual practices suggest that "the wrongfulness 
of the act, the fact of the hann, and the causal relation between the two 
are all pertinent to the outcome of the lawsuit."2 
In the end, Coleman undertakes a rigorous examination of econo-
mist claims and concludes that no economic analysis has successfully 
argued a) that the outcome of torts really is efficient cost reduction, nor 
b) that a causal story exists which can use this purported outcome to 
explain the very structure and existence of tort law. Without either of 
these arguments in place, Coleman worries further whether 'efficiency' 
as the function of torts is even morally desirable in (roughly) a justice-
as-fairness sense; that is, a sense that is pai1 of our "pretheoretic" 
conceptions about tort law.3 Coleman's view is that a non-reductive 
theory can better explain these concerns by showing how the law figures 
in the wide-ranging context of our moral and social practices. A certain 
principle (corrective justice) is "embodied" by the practices that consti-
tute tort law, and in turn, tort law is explained by this principle. 
2 Ibid at 20. 
3 Ibid. at 32, 15. 
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Coleman's account of tort law results in an innovative understand-
ing of the nature of legal systems since it commits him to an innovative 
understanding of the positivist rule of recognition. In the remainder of 
the book, Coleman advances this understanding against the arguments 
of both exclusive legal positivists like Joseph Raz and quasi-naturalists 
like Ronald Dworkin.4 To discharge the book's promise to offer a full 
jurisprudential theory, Coleman must defend a conception of law's 
conventionality and authority, a rival to the accounts of these concepts 
as advanced by Raz and Dworkin. 
Through forceful, and at times repetitive argument, Coleman asserts 
that the conventionally accepted criteria of legality can be (and in fact 
are) expressed by a rule (the rule of recognition) that imposes an 
obligation on officials to evaluate cases only according to those norms 
that satisfy the made-explicit criteria.5 Coleman maintains, with H.L.A. 
Hart, that the very possibility oflaw is to be explained in terms of social 
facts, and the possibility of legal authority is to be explained in terms of 
a convention, namely, an adherence to a rule of recognition. As 
Coleman sees it, his reading of this 'conventionality thesis' avoids 
reducing legal authority to social facts, by themselves devoid of any 
explanation oflaw's normativity, and instead explains legal authority in 
terms of normative social practices. The virtue of this shift is that it 
allows Coleman to capture the normativity essential to legal authority. 
Utilizing contemporary Wittgensteinian views on the possibility of 
rule-following, Coleman advances his notion of 'principle embodied by 
practice' as a way of making intelligible the claim that officials in a legal 
system adhere to the rule of recognition through their convergent 
behaviour. Generally, if the same rule is being followed by two or more 
officials, then they must share a grasp of the rule that is reflected both in 
convergent behaviour and in broadly shared grasps of the rule's applica-
tion. They must share what Coleman calls a "framework of interac-
tion. "6 Relating this notion of rule-following back to the 'internal point 
of view' that Hart used to explain convergent behaviour, Coleman 
purports to explain both how the rule of recognition exists and how it 
4 Natural law jurisprudence is mentioned only in passing, amid concerns of whether morality 
can figure in the content of a legal system. 
5 Coleman, supra note lat 72. 
6 Coleman, supra note lat 82. 
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provides governance. Further, an individual taking the internal point of 
view toward a rule is provided a reason for action distinct from and in 
addition to the reason a person already has for obeying that rule, namely, 
by turning habitual behaviour into a rule. 
A worry surfaces here that a person may unilaterally extinguish a 
rule as such in a way that she may not extinguish a duty imposed by a 
law. If this is true, Coleman's argument for the role of the internal point 
of view does not do the necessary work for explaining the possibility of 
legal authority. Coleman wrestles with this problem,7 (which he at-
tributes to social theory and not to jurisprudence) and in so doing, he 
imports the notion of a shared cooperative activity (scA).8 A SCA is an 
activity that involves participation with a shared intention converging 
on a common goal. Still, Coleman wonders whether he may have just 
offered an account of an extra reason to obey a law without unpacking 
the notion of duty in a way illuminated by the rule of recognition. He 
does not think, however, that his theory stands or falls with this claim. 
Having argued that legal authority is to be explained in terms of social 
conventions, Coleman fleshes out whether or not an inclusive rule of 
recognition, that is, a rule of recognition that includes moral norms as 
criteria of legality, is consistent with his model, or, indeed with any 
model, of law's authority. After some analysis and consideration of 
opponents' claims, Coleman concludes that what is conceptually true of 
law per se need not be true of every individual law, leaving his account 
of authority open to criticism on this point. 
In the latter part of the book,9 Coleman takes up a defence of his 
method of conceptual analysis, one which he believes he shares in spirit 
with H.L.A. Hart, and in method, broadly conceived, with W.V. Quine. 
This lively and thoughtful account of analyticity-skepticism and prag-
matism provides a pleasant and helpful way to close and to collect one's 
thoughts around Coleman's. Arguments advanced by Ronald Dworkin 
as well as contemporary exclusive legal positivists are responded to in 
turn, and it is at least a virtue of Coleman's thought that he strives for 
consistency in his method and manner of replies. 
7 Coleman, supra note I at 92-93. 
8 Coleman, supra note I at 96. 
9 Coleman, supra note I at 151. 
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The book is not written for the beginner in legal theory; it presup 
poses at least an intermediate familiarity with concepts in the philoso 
phy of law. Since a good deal of the argument rests on post-Quinear 
epistemology, it also helps to have a general understanding of 
in contemporary philosophy of language and theory of knowledge. Tht: 
interested reader can set these details aside, however, and still be 
impressed by Coleman's original and lucid account of the 
between corrective justice, legal authority and normativity, and of the 
role of moral concepts in legal discourse. 
